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ABSTRACT
Security vulnerabilities are among the most critical software de-
fects in existence. As such, they require patches that are correct and
quickly deployed. This motivates an automatic patch generation
method that emphasizes both soundness and wide applicability. To
address this challenge, we propose Senx, which uses three novel
patch generation techniques to create patches for out-of-bounds
read/write vulnerabilities. Senx uses symbolic execution to extract
expressions from the source code of a target application to synthe-
size patches. To reduce the runtime overhead of patches, it uses
loop cloning and access range analysis to analyze loops involved
in these vulnerabilities and elevate patches outside of loops. For
vulnerabilities that span multiple functions, Senx uses expression
translation to translate expressions and place them in a function
scope where all values are available to create the patch. This enables
Senx to patch vulnerabilities with complex loops and interprocedu-
ral dependencies that previous semantics-based patch generation
systems cannot handle.
We have implemented a prototype using this approach. Our
evaluation shows that the patches generated by Senx successfully fix
76% of 42 real-world vulnerabilities from 11 applications including
various tools or libraries for manipulating graphics/media files, a
programming language interpreter, a relational database engine, a
collection of programming tools for creating and managing binary
programs, and a collection of basic file, shell, and text manipulation
tools. All patches that Senx produces are sound, and Senx correctly
aborts patch generations in cases where its analysis will fall short.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fixing security vulnerabilities in a timely manner is critical to
protect users from security compromises and to prevent vendors
from losing user confidence. A recent study has shown that creating
software patches is often the bottleneck of the process of fixing
security vulnerabilities [19]. As a result, an entire line of research
inquiry into automated patch generation has arisen to try to address
this challenge [15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 32, 36, 37, 51, 52].
Automatic patch generation approaches broadly break down into
two categories: search-based and semantics-based. Search-based
approaches try arbitrary code changes and use a battery of test
cases to check whether any of the changes succeeded in fixing
the bug [20, 25, 52]. Because various search-based techniques can
generate arbitrary code changes, they are applicable to a wide
variety of bugs, but the correctness of the generated patches can
1 char ∗ f oo_ma l l o c ( x , y ) {
2 return ( char ∗ ) ma l l o c ( x ∗ y + 1 ) ;
3 }
4
5 / / p r i n t a f l a t t e n e d a r r ay
6 in t foo ( char ∗ i npu t ) {
7 / / i n p u t f o rma t : RRCCDDD . . . . DDD
8 / / RR : number o f rows
9 / / CC : number o f co lumns
10 / / DDD . . . DDD : f l a t t e n e d a r r ay da ta
11 / /
12 / / b en i gn i n pu t : 0 2 0 3 1 2 3 4 5 6
13 / / o u t p u t :
14 / / 1 2 3
15 / / 4 5 6
16 in t s i z e = s t r l e n ( i npu t ) ;
17 char ∗ p = inpu t ;
18 in t rows = e x t r a c t _ i n t ( p ) ;
19 p +=2 ;
20 s i z e −= 2 ;
21 in t c o l s = e x t r a c t _ i n t ( p ) ;
22 p +=2 ;
23 s i z e −=2;
24 + i f ( ( double ) ( c o l s +1 ) ∗ ( s i z e / c o l s ) >
25 + rows ∗ ( c o l s + 1 ) + 1 )
26 + return −1;
27 char ∗ ou tpu t = f oo_ma l l o c ( rows , c o l s + 1 ) ;
28 i f ( ! ou tpu t )
29 return −1;
30 bar ( p , s i z e , c o l s , ou tpu t ) ;
31 p r i n t f ( "%s \ n " , ou tpu t ) ;
32 f r e e ( ou tpu t ) ;
33 return 0 ;
34 }
35
36 void bar ( char ∗ s r c , in t s i z e , in t co l s , char ∗ d e s t ) {
37 char ∗ p = d e s t ; char ∗ q = s r c ;
38 while ( q < s r c + s i z e ) {
39 for ( unsigned j = 0 ; j < c o l s ; j ++)
40 ∗ ( p++) = ∗ ( q ++) ;
41 ∗ ( p++) = ' \ n ' ;
42 }
43 ∗ p = ' \ 0 ' ;
44 }
Listing 1: A buffer overflow CVE-2012-0947 with a patch
(prefixed with ’+’).
be uneven, and depend heavily on the comprehensiveness of the
test cases [29, 37]. In contrast, semantics-based techniques use code
analysis (e.g. static analysis and symbolic execution) to produce
patches that attempt to address the underlying bug rather than
change the code just enough to satisfy the test cases [28, 32]. As
a result, semantics-based techniques are more likely to produce
correct patches, but are less applicable, since they are limited to
cases where the code analysis is able to analyze the defective code.
When used to fix security vulnerabilities, the requirements that
patches work correctly is even more pressing, as falsely believing
that a vulnerability has been addressed when in fact it has not,
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may lead a user to disable other mitigating protections, such as
removing configuration workarounds or firewall rules. In this pa-
per, we propose Senx, which guarantees that either the patch it
produces addresses the vulnerability under all conditions (i.e. it is
sound), or it does not produce a patch at all. Despite this rigorous
requirement, we find that using sound semantic analysis Senx is
still able to produce patches for over 76% of the vulnerabilities in a
bug corpus composed of buffer overflows, integer overflows and
memory corruption due to bad type-casts. These vulnerabilities
involve complex code structures that code analysis techniques tra-
ditionally find challenging. For example, buffer overflows often
involve complex loop structures. In addition, formulating a check
to test a memory access is within the memory-range of the data-
structure, may require the patch generation system to synthesize
interprocedural code if the allocation of the memory and the faulty
memory access occur in different functions.
To concretely illustrate these challenges, consider the buffer over-
flow vulnerability CVE-2012-0947 [39] from libav in Listing 1. The
vulnerability arises because the code copies user-provided data into
a buffer whose allocation size is computed based on the number of
rows and columns specified in the input, but the amount of data
copied is based on the size of the data provided. For reference, the
correct patch is provided on lines 24- 26, which consists of check-
ing if the amount of data to be copied ((cols+1)×(size/cols))
by the nested loop in bar is greater than the size of the buffer
(rows×(cols+1)+1) allocated by foo_malloc, in which case the
patch returns an error to foo’s caller. To generate this patch, Senx
must correctly identify the pointer p used to write to the buffer
dest in bar and infer the memory access range of p from the nested
loops. Further, Senx must detect that the allocation of dest is actu-
ally performed in another function foo_malloc and symbolically
compute its allocation size. Finally, Senx must identify foo as the
common caller of both bar and foo_malloc and translate the ex-
pression for both the memory access range of p from bar and the
allocation size of dest from foo_malloc into the scope of foo so
that the patch can be generated.
Senx accomplishes this with the introduction of three novel
patch generation techniques. First, rather than try to statically
analyze arbitrarily complex loops, Senx attempts to clone the loop
code to be used in the patch predicate, but slicing out any code
that may have side effects from the cloned loop so that the loop
only computes the memory access range of the pointers in the
loop. We call this technique loop cloning. For loops where code
that has side effects that cannot be safely removed – for example,
the loop execution depends on the result of a function call with
side effects—Senx falls back on a symbolic analysis technique we
developed, called access range analysis. Finally, to identify and place
the patch in a function scope where all expressions required in
the predicate are available, Senx uses expression translation, which
uses the equivalence between function arguments and parameters
to generate a set of equivalent expressions. This enables Senx to
generate patches where the defective code is spread across multiple
functions. This overcomes a limitation of all previous semantics-
based patch generate systems that we are aware of, which can only
generate patches for defects that are enclosed entirely within in a
single function [20, 25, 28, 32].
In our experiments, Senx generates 32 correct patches out of
42 vulnerabilities, and in the remaining 10 cases, correctly detects
that it will not be able to generate a patch and aborts instead of
generating a patch that does not completely fix the vulnerability.
This paper makes the following main contributions:
• We describe the design of Senx, an automatic patch gen-
eration system for buffer overfow, integer overflow and
bad cast vulnerabilities using three novel program anal-
ysis techniques: loop cloning, access range analysis and
expression translation.
• Senx uses a symbolic ISA that is optimized for converting
an IR used for symbolic execution back to source code. This
enables Senx to generate source code patches. Particularly,
Senx’s ISA supports the synthesis of source code containing
array indices and C/C++ structs and classes.
• We prototype Senx on top of the KLEE symbolic execution
engine and evaluate it on a corpus of 42 vulnerabilities
across 11 popular applications, including PHP interpreter,
sqlite database engine, binutils utilities for creating and
managing binary programs, and various tools or libraries
for manipulating graphics/media files. Senx generates cor-
rect patches in 32 of the cases and aborts the remainder
because it is unable to determine semantic correctness in
the other cases. The evaluation demonstrates that all three
techniques are required to generate patches, and that fail-
ure to find a common function scope in which to place a
patch is the most frequent reason for failure.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define
and characterize the problem Senx addresses. Section 3 and Section 4
describe the design and implementation of Senx respectively. We
present evaluation results in Section 5 and discuss related work in
Section 6. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We begin by defining what a Senx patch is, what guarantees that a
Senx patch provides, and then the vulnerability domain, i.e. vulner-
ability types that Senx can currently address.
2.1 Patch
For a given vulnerability, a Senx patch fixes the corresponding
vulnerability condition [3], which evaluates to true if and only if the
vulnerability will be triggered. A Senx patch can take one of two
forms: a) detects if a vulnerability condition is true and if so, raises
an error to direct program execution away from the path where
the vulnerability resides (we call this a check-and-error patch); b)
prevents a vulnerability condition from ever becoming true (we call
this a repair patch).
Soundness. Because the patches that Senx generates directly ad-
dress the vulnerability condition, it prevents the vulnerability from
being triggered under all conditions. Senx only generates patches
if the vulnerability falls into one of the vulnerability classes in its
vulnerability domain and the vulnerable code meets a number of
requirements that Senx requires to guarantee the soundness of the
patch. If all these conditions are met, Senx will generate a sound
patch, and if they are not, Senx does not generate a patch at all.
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2.2 Vulnerability domain
Senx is designed to generate patches for specific, common vulner-
ability types in its vulnerability domain. Each such vulnerability
class is defined by a vulnerability condition. We describe the three
vulnerability classes currently in Senx’s vulnerability domain:
Buffer overflow. A buffer overflow occurs when series of memory
accesses traversing a buffer in a loop crosses from a memory loca-
tion inside the buffer to a memory location outside of the buffer. We
use the term buffer in the broad sense to refer to either a bounded
memory region (such as a struct or class object) or an array. The
memory access can be the result of an array dereference or pointer
dereference. Senx handles both the case when the memory access
exceeds the upper range of the buffer and the case when the mem-
ory access falls below the lower range (sometimes called a buffer
underflow). The vulnerability condition for buffer overflow eval-
uates whether the range of memory addresses that code within a
loop accesses exceeds either the upper or lower range of the buffer.
Bad cast. A bad cast occurs when a memory access is computed
off a base pointer, and exceeds the upper bound of the object the
base pointer points to. It is caused by a cast of a pointer to an
incorrect object type. The memory access can be an access to a
struct field or a class attribute and the struct or class can be nested.
The vulnerability condition for bad cast evaluates whether the
memory address targeted by a memory access exceeds the upper
bound of the object pointed to by the base pointer used to compute
the memory address.
Integer overflow. An integer overflow occurs when an integer is
assigned a value larger or smaller than can be represented. This
manifests as a large value that is increased and becomes a small
value, or a small value that is decreased and becomes a large value.
Senx addresses integer overflows whose result is zero and used
as the allocation size of a buffer, because any subsequent memory
access to a buffer of zero byte will fall outside the buffer. The vul-
nerability condition for such integer overflow evaluates whether
the size specified for a buffer allocation is zero and is the result of
an integer overflow.
As a prototype, we have started with only these three vulnerabil-
ity classes. Nevertheless, they are representative enough to capture
a good percentage of CVE vulnerabilities—we conducted an infor-
mal analysis and found that roughly 10% of CVE vulnerabilities fall
into one of these classes. We believe the principles behind Senx can
be extended to other vulnerability classes, which we intend to do
in future work.
3 DESIGN
3.1 Overview
To generate a patch, Senx requires an input that can trigger the tar-
get vulnerability, which it runs on the target program on a symbolic
execution engine. This execution is the first of five steps to gen-
erate a patch: vulnerability detection, vulnerability identification,
predicate generation, patch placement, and patch synthesis.
First, during vulnerability detection, Senx symbolically executes
the application with a vulnerability-triggering input and extracts
expressions for all variables used or defined during the execution.
While many systems use symbolic execution to extract path con-
straints and generate inputs for program coverage, Senx only exe-
cutes the single path that results from the vulnerability-triggering
input and focuses on extracting symbolic expressions in such a way
that a source code patch can be synthesized. Senx determines a
vulnerability point [3] at which the application meets one of the
vulnerability conditions in its vulnerability domain. Senx will abort
patch generation if any variable used during the execution is the
result of an operation that cannot be expressed by Senx’s expression
builder, which is described in Section 3.2—if the expressions are
incomplete, Senx cannot guarantee the soundness of the generated
patch. If no vulnerability point can be detected, Senx will also abort
patch generation.
Second, during vulnerability identification, Senx uses the results
of the execution to classify the vulnerability into one of the three
classes given in Section 2.2 using their respective vulnerability
conditions. During execution, Senx also performs a reachability
analysis to ensure that the executed path covers all reaching def-
initions for variable expressions in the vulnerability condition. If
statically there exists a reaching definition that wasn’t on the ex-
ecuted path, then the expression for one of the variables in the
vulnerability condition may be incomplete and the patch produced
may be unsound, and Senx will abort patch generation under these
circumstances. To ensure that Senx statically captures all reach-
ing definitions, Senx’s reachability analysis is enhanced with DSA
pointer alias analysis [22] to ensure that there are no aliases that
might alter a reaching definition. The pointer analysis returns a con-
fidence category that can be either “must alias”, “must not alias” or
“may alias”. If any pointer “must alias” or “may alias” with a variable
in the vulnerability condition, Senx also aborts patch generation.
Third, during predicate generation, using the vulnerability class
and associated condition, Senx will generate a predicate that will
be used to create a patch for the vulnerability. We describe the
predicate generation process in more detail in Section 3.3. For each
vulnerability class, we will also describe the set of requirements
that must be met to guarantee soundness.
Fourth, during patch placement, Senx finds a location to place a
patch where all the variables in the predicate are in program scope.
In some cases, the predicate may contain variables from different
function scopes, so that a single statement generated using those
variables could not be evaluated at any one place in the program.
For example, in Listing 1, the size of buffer dest is defined by an
expression over the variables x and y in foo_malloc, which are
not available in the scope of function bar where the loop that
overflows occurs. In these cases, Senx uses expression translation
to translate those variables into expressions that are in the scope
of a common caller or callee of the functions. In Listing 1, Senx
recognizes that function foo is a common caller of both foo_malloc
and bar and translates all the terms of the predicate into expressions
over variables available in the scope of foo. We describe expression
translation in more detail in Section 3.4. Senx will abort patch
generation if expression translation fails.
Finally, during patch synthesis, Senx generates the patch code.
The expressions that Senx extracts during vulnerability detection
are specially designed for easy translation back into C/C++ source
code. For example, Senx maintains special information that allows
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Table 1: Rules for building expressions.
Instruction Semantic Rule to build expression Description
val = Load var val ← var RHS := getExpr(var ) read from var
val = Load ∗p val ← ∗p RHS := makeDeref(getExpr(p)) read via pointer p
Store var, v1 p ← v1 RHS := getExpr(v1), LHS := var write v1 to var
Store ∗p, v1 ∗p ← v1 RHS := getExpr(v1), LHS := makeDeref(p) write via pointer p
val = GetElement var, f ield val ← StructOp(var, f ield ) RHS := makeStructOp(var, f ield ) read from a struct field
val = GetElement var, index val ← ArrayOp(var, index ) RHS := makeArrayOp(var, index ) read from an array element
val = BinOp v1, v2 val ← BinOp(v1, v2) RHS := makeBinOp(getExpr(v1), getExpr(v2)) binary operations
val = CmpOp v1, v2 val ← CmpOp(v1, v2) RHS := makeCmpOp(getExpr(v1), getExpr(v2)) comparisons
val = Allocate size val ← Allocate(size) RHS := getName(val ) allocate a local variable
Branch label PC ← label N/A unconditional branch
Branch cond, label1, label2 PC ← label1 if cond N/A conditional branch
PC ← label2 if ¬cond N/A
val = Call f (a, . . . ) val ← f (a, . . . ) RHS := makeCall(getName(f ), getExpr(a), . . . ) call function f with a, . . .
Ret v1 val ← v1 && RHS := getExpr(v1) && return v1 to caller
caller .val ← v1 caller .RHS := getExpr(v1)
it to synthesize field dereferences of structs (even nested structs)
or array dereferences. Currently the only vulnerability class for
which a repair patch can be generated is an integer overflow where
the overflow occurred as a result of an arithmetic operation whose
result type does not match the type of the variable the result was
being stored into. In this case, a patch that casts the result into the
type of the variable avoids the overflow and is inserted into the
code. In all other cases, Senx generates a check-and-error patch that
checks the patch predicate and calls the error handling code if the
predicate evaluates to true. Senx uses Talos [19] to find and select
the error handling code to call. Senx will abort patch generation for
check-and-error patches if Talos cannot determine suitable error-
handling code to call.
3.2 Expression Builder
We base our expression builder on KLEE [6], but as we mentioned
earlier, Senx uses its own symbolic representation as KLEE’s rep-
resentation does not store enough information to easily translate
expressions back into source code to construct patches. As a re-
sult, we design our own symbolic representation using a set of
pseudo-instructions listed in Table 1.
The instructions include Load and Storememory access instruc-
tions, BinOp binary operations such as arithmetic operations and
CmpOp comparison operations such as > and ≥, StructOp struct
operations that access a field of a struct, ArrayOp array operations
that access an element of an array, Allocate for local variable allo-
cation, Branch for unconditional and conditional branches, Call
for function calls and Ret for function returns. Each instruction can
have an optional label denoted as label. The decompilation uses
a program counter that points to the current instruction, which is
referred to as PC in the table. For each instruction, Senx represents
it using the corresponding semantic in the “Semantic” column. The
results of these operations are stored in Single Static Assignment
(SSA) form such that each instruction instance has a unique vari-
able associated with it. The execution does not distinguish between
registers and memory.
Later, during patch synthesis, source code is generated using the
rules defined in the “Rule to build expression” column. Each seman-
tic expression is of the form LHS := RHS, where LHS and RHS are
the left side and the right side of an assignment respectively. An ex-
plicit LHS is used only for Store instructions. The LHS for all other
instructions is the SSA value associated with each instruction. The
Table 2: Operations performed by expression builder.
Operation Description
getExpr get the expression associated with an
instruction or the name of a variable
getName get the name of a variable
makeDeref build an expression to denote dereference
makeBinOp build an expression to denote a binary
operation including arithmetic operations,
bitwise logic operations, and bitwise shift
operations
makeCmpOp build an expression to denote a comparison
including <, >,=,,, ≥, ≤
makeStructOp build an expression to denote an access
to a struct field directly or via a pointer
makeArrayOp build an expression to denote an access
to an array element
makeCall build an expression to denote a function call
including the name of the function and all
the arguments
expression generationmaintains a call stack so that each Ret instruc-
tion sets a value in its caller, denoted by caller, with the return
value. A good deal of the heavy lifting for expression generation is
done by helper functions as described in Table 2. Each of these func-
tions generates an expression according to their description. For
example, makeDeref("p") returns "*p", where ∗ represents pointer
dereference. In keeping with SSA, the expressions generated for an
instruction are stored along with the instruction. In this way, the
expressions associated with an instruction can easily be retrieved
by referring to the instruction.
Complex Data Types. Because the patch generated by Senx is in
the form of the source code of a target program, the expressions
must conform to the proper language syntax of the program.
Expressions for simple data types such as char, integer, or float,
are generated in a rather straightforward way. However, expres-
sions for complex data types such as C/C++ structs and arrays are
more challenging. For example, a field of a struct must be attached
to its parent object, and the generated syntax changes depending
on whether the parent object is referenced using a pointer or with
a variable holding the actual object. Arrays and structs can also be
nested and the proper syntax must be used to denote the level of
nesting relative to the top level object.
To address the challenge, Senx’s symbolic ISA has the GetElement
instruction, which reads a field from a struct or an element from
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an array. The expression builder leverages the GetElement instruc-
tions and debug symbols that describe the ordered list of struct
fields to construct expressions denoting access to complex data
types including arrays and structs. GetElement is overloaded, but
since the expression builder maintains the data type of each vari-
able, it calls the appropriate version based on the type passed in var.
To generate valid C/C++ code for a symbolic expression, it retrieves
the variable expression associated with var. If var is an array, it
uses the helper function makeArrayOp, which recursively generates
code associated with the index argument. If var is a struct, it calls
the helper function makeStructOp , which returns the name of the
field in the struct. To determine whether an access to the struct is
via a pointer or directly to an object, it checks whether var is a
result of a Load instruction or not, and generates the expression
accordingly.
In order to build expressions for complex data access involving
nested complex data types, both makeArrayOp and makeStrutOp
use the expression for the variable var, which can be the result
of a previous Load instruction or GetElement instruction. In this
way, expressions for complex data access such as foo→f.bar[10],
where foo is a pointer to a struct that has a field f and bar is an
array belonging to f, can be constructed.
3.3 Predicate Generation
Predicate generation is specific to the vulnerability condition that
Senx identifies. We discuss in detail how Senx generates predicates
for each vulnerability class in its vulnerability domain.
Integer Overflow. Since Senx has already identified the arithmetic
operation variables that will overflow in the previous step, it is
straightforward for Senx to generate a predicate that will check
the values of the variables before the arithmetic operation to see if
they will generate an overflow. In this case, given that the sound-
ness requirements have already been satisfied in the vulnerability
identification stage, the expressions extracted during that stage will
be sound, so the predicate that performs a check over those ex-
pressions will also be sound. Once the predicate is generated, Senx
determines whether it should generate a repair patch (with a cast)
or a check-and-error patch. So long as the extracted expressions
are sound, the generated predicate is sound.
Buffer Overflow and Bad Cast. Senx fixes both of these vulner-
ability classes with check-and-error patches. The predicates pro-
duced for both vulnerability classes are similar in structure and
consist of a comparison of a memory access with an allocation
range. For bad casts, the memory access is a single memory access
point, while for buffer overflows, it is a series of accesses performed
in the loop that forms a memory access range. In both cases, it
is compared with the size of the object being accessed, which is
extracted when the object is allocated. We refer to the size as the ob-
ject’s allocation range. With this, Senx generates a predicate of the
form: (mem_access_upper > alloc_upper | |mem_access_lower <
alloc_lower ). In the case where it is a memory access point instead
of amemory access range, bothmem_access_upper andmem_access_lower
are equivalent.
To compute the memory access point for a bad cast, Senx uses
the expressions extracted to compute the offset of the struct field
or class attribute being accessed and generates an expression that
adds the offset to the base pointer being used in the access. We
define the base pointer as the pointer that points to the start address
of the struct or class object to which the field or attribute being
accessed belongs. If the field or attribute is a direct member of the
struct or class, i.e. not a member of a nested struct or class, the
base pointer is simply the pointer extracted from the expressions.
Otherwise, we perform interprocedural dataflow analysis to find
the base pointer from which the extracted pointer is derived. As in
the case of the integer overflow, so long as soundness requirements
for the expression builder are met, the extracted memory access
point is also sound.
The allocation range is computed in a similar way. Senx identifies
the point where the buffer is allocated using expressions extracted
by the expression builder and examines the argument passed to
the allocation function (i.e. malloc or some variant). With this,
Senx can calculate the upper and lower bounds of the object being
accessed. This computation is sound if the expressions extracted
are sound and the memory allocation is correctly identified, which
is true if the application only uses standard memory allocation
functions that Senx knows about. Our Senx prototype currently
only supports standard libc and C++ memory allocation functions.
Finally, computing a memory access range over a loop is more
complex because loops may execute for a variable number of it-
erations. To compute the memory access range, Senx uses two
complementary loop analysis techniques, loop cloning and access
range analysis. Both loop cloning and access range analysis take as
input a function F in the target program and an instruction inst
that performs the faulty access in the buffer overflow, and returns
the symbolic memory access range [A1,An ] of inst. This symbolic
access range can then be compared with the allocation range in the
predicate.
Loop Cloning. The key idea of loop cloning is to produce new
code that can be called safely at runtime to return the access range
without causing any side-effects, i.e. changing program state or
affecting program input/output. The new code is constructed from
existing code, referred to as cloning, and will be called at a location
where the allocation range is available so that the access range
returned by the new code can be compared against the allocation
range.
Because the patch must be inserted into a function where both
the access range and allocation range are available, loop cloning
first searches on the call chain that leads to F to find such a function.
The search starts from the immediate caller of F and stops at the
first function Fp in which the allocation range is available.
If no such function can be found, Senxwill not be able to generate
a patch. If such a function is found, loop cloning then clones each
function Fi along the call chain from F until Fp into the new code
that returns the access range. As a result, each Fi is either a direct
or indirect caller of F or is F itself.
Loop cloning needs to satisfy two requirements: 1) F must com-
pute the access range and pass the access range to its caller; 2)
any direct or indirect caller of F must pass the access range that it
receives from its callee upwards to the next function along the call
chain. Each Fi is cloned using the following steps.
(1) Loop cloning clones the entire code of Fi into Fi_clone.
5
Anonymous submission #434 to ACM CCS 2018
1 in t decode ( const char ∗ in , char ∗ out ) {
2 in t i ;
3 char c ;
4 i = 0 ;
5 while ( ( c = ∗ ( i n ++) ) != ' \ 0 ' ) {
6 i f ( c == ' \ 1 ' )
7 c = ∗ ( i n ++) − 1 ;
8 out [ i ++] = c ;
9 }
10 return i ;
11 }
12
13 char ∗ udf_decode ( const char ∗ data , in t d a t a l e n ) {
14 char ∗ r e t = ma l l o c ( d a t a l e n ) ;
15 i f ( r e t && ! decode ( da t a +1 , r e t ) ) {
16 f r e e ( r e t ) ;
17 r e t = NULL ;
18 }
19 return r e t ;
20 }
Listing 2: A complex loop involving a complex loop exit
condition and multiple updates to loop induction variable
on multiple execution paths.
(2) Using program slicing, it removes all statements that are
not needed in order to computer the access range or pass
the access range to Fp . If Fi is F, it retains statements on
which the execution of inst is dependent. If Fi is a direct
or indirect caller of F, it retains statements on which the
call to F is dependent.
(3) It changes the return type of Fi_clone to void and re-
moves any return statement in Fi_clone.
(4) It adds two output parameters start and end to Fi_clone.
If Fi is F, it inserts statements immediately before the
(nested) loops to copy the initial value of the pointer or
array index used in the faulty access into start, and state-
ments immediately after the loops to copy the end value
of such pointer or array index into end. If Fi is a caller of
F, it changes the call statement to include the two output
parameters in the list of call arguments.
After cloning each Fi , loop cloning inserts a call to the last cloned
function into Fp , which returns the access range in start and end.
Subsequently a patch will be synthesized to leverage the returned
access range.
To see how loop cloning works, consider the example in List-
ing 2, which presents a loop adapted from a real buffer overflow
vulnerability CVE-2007-1887 [35] in PHP, a scripting language in-
terpreter. The buffer overflow occurs in function decode. The loop
features a complex loop exit condition and multiple updates to loop
induction variable in that depend on the content of the buffer that
in points to. The result of loop cloning is shown in Listing 3. Loop
cloning is invoked with decode as F, and the faulty access at line 5
as inst. It first finds that function udf_decode is on the call chain
to decode and in which the allocation range is available. Because
udf_decode directly calls decode, it only needs to clone decode.
It then clones function decode into decode_clone, after which it
applies program slicing to decode_clonewith line 5 and variable c
and in that are accessed at line 5 as the slicing criteria. decode also
has a potential write buffer overflow at line 8, but in this example,
we focus on generating a predicate that will check whether in can
1 + void decode_c l one ( const char ∗ in , char ∗ out , char ∗ ∗
s t a r t , char ∗ ∗ end ) {
2 char c ;
3 + ∗ s t a r t = in ;
4 while ( ( c = ∗ ( i n ++) ) != ' \ 0 ' ) {
5 i f ( c == ' \ 1 ' )
6 c = ∗ ( i n ++) − 1 ;
7 }
8 + ∗ end = in ;
9 }
10
11 char ∗ udf_decode ( const char ∗ data , in t d a t a l e n ) {
12 char ∗ r e t = ma l l o c ( d a t a l e n ) ;
13 + char ∗ s t a r t , ∗ end ;
14 + decode_c l one ( da t a +1 , r e t , &s t a r t , &end ) ;
15 i f ( r e t && ! decode ( da t a +1 , r e t ) ) {
16 f r e e ( r e t ) ;
17 r e t = NULL ;
18 }
19 return r e t ;
20 }
Listing 3: A cloned and sliced loop that no longer contains
any statements that have side-effects and returns the
number of iterations. Statements prefixed with ’+’ are added
or modified by Senx to count and return the number of loop
iterations.
exceed the end of the buffer it points to. The program slicing uses
a backward analysis and removes all statements that are irrelevant
to the value of c and in at line 5, including line 2, 4 and 8. After
program slicing, it changes the return type of decode_clone into
void and removes all return statements. And it adds two output pa-
rameters start and end to the list of parameters of decode_clone.
Then it inserts a statement at line 3 to copy the initial value of in
to start before the loop and a statement at line 8 to copy the end
value of in to end after the loop. Finally it inserts into function
udf_decode a call to decode_clone at line 14 and a statement to
declare start and end at line 13.
To satisfy the soundness requirements, the new code produced
by loop cloning must not have any side-effect of changing program
state or affecting program input/output. If the produced code has
side-effect, Senx will abort loop cloning.
Access Range Analysis. Using LLVM’s built-in loop canonicaliza-
tion functionality [7], access range analysis computes the access
range of normalized loops. Loop canonicalization seeks to convert
the loop into a standard form with a pre-header that initializes the
loop iterator variable, a header that checks whether to end the loop,
and a single backedge. Extracting the access range for a single loop
in this way is straightforward. The main difficulty is extending this
to handle nested loops.
Access range analysis is implemented for nested loops using the
algorithm described in Algorithm 1. It analyzes the loops enclosing
a memory access instruction inst in function F, starting with the
innermost loop and iterating to the outermost, accumulating incre-
ments and decrements on the loop induction variables including
the pointer used by inst.
Since the loop in bar of Listing 1 can be normalized, we use it
as an example of how Algorithm 1 can be applied to a nested loop.
So F is bar and inst is the memory write using pointer p at line
42. For each loop, it first retrieves the loop iterator variable and
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Algorithm 1 Finding the access range of a memory access.
Input: F : a function
inst : a memory access instruction in F
Output: acc_initial : initial address acccessed by inst
acc_end : end address accessed by inst
1: procedure analyze_access_range
2: ▷ acc: accumulated updates to induction variables
3: acc ← ∅
4: innermost_loop ← innermost_loop(inst)
5: outermost_loop ← outermost_loop(inst)
6: visited ← ∅
7: for l ∈ [innermost_loop,outermost_loop] do
8: iter , initial , end ←find_loop_bounds(F , l)
9: updates,visited ←find_loop_updates(l ,visited)
10: ▷ Symbolically add up induction updates
11: for var ,upd ∈ updates do
12: acc{var } ← sym_add(acc{var },upd)
13: end for
14: ▷ Symbolically denote the number of iterations of l
as count
15: upd_iter ← updates{iter }
16: count ←sym_div(sym_sub(end, initial),upd_iter ))
17: ▷ Symbolically multiply induction updates by the
number of iterations of l
18: for var ,upd ∈ acc do
19: if ¬is_initialized_in_last_loop(var ) then
20: acc{var } ←sym_mul(acc{var }, count)
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: ptr ←get_pointer(inst)
25: f irst_inst ←loop_head_instruction(outermost_loop)
26: ▷ Find the definition of ptr that reaches f irst_inst
27: acc_initial ←reaching_definition(F , f irst_inst ,ptr )
28: acc_end ←sym_add(acc_initial ,acc{p})
29: return acc_initial ,acc_end
30: end procedure
the bounds of it by calling helper function find_loop_bounds, and
the list of induction variables of the loop along with the update
to each of them, which we refer to as the fixed amount that is
increased or decreased to an induction variable on each iteration of
the loop, by calling another helper function find_loop_updates.
In our example, we have iter = j, initial = 0, end = cols and
j 7→ 1, p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1 in updates for the innermost for loop from
lines 39-40.
Algorithm 1 then symbolically accumulates the update to each
induction variable to a data structure referred to by acc , which maps
each induction variable to an expression denoting the accumulated
update to the induction variable. As for the example, it will store
j 7→ 1, p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1 into acc for the innermost for loop. After
that, it synthesizes the expression to denote the total number of
iterations for the loop. At line 16 of the algorithm, we will have
count = cols which is simplified from (cols-0)/1.
Having the total number of iterations, it multiplies the accumu-
lated update for each induction variable by the total number of
iterations. So acc will have j 7→ cols, p 7→ cols, q 7→ cols after
the loop from line 18 to 22 in Algorithm 1.
Once this is done, it moves on to analyze the next loop enclos-
ing inst , which in Listing 1 is the while loop enclosing the in-
ner for loop. As a consequence, we will have iter = q, initial =
src, end = src+size and p 7→ 1 in updates at line 10 of the al-
gorithm, j 7→ cols, p 7→ cols + 1, q 7→ cols in acc and count =
size/cols at line 17 of the algorithm, and finally j 7→ cols, p 7→
(cols+1)*(size/cols), q 7→ size in acc . Note that the algorithm
will not multiply the number of iterations of the loop to j because
j is always initialized in the last analyzed loop, the innermost for
loop.
After analyzing all the loops enclosing inst , the algorithm gets
the pointer ptr used by inst and performs reaching definition
dataflow analysis to find the definition that reaches the beginning
of the outermost loop. As for the example, we will have ptr = p and
the assignment p=dest at line 39 of bar as the reaching definition
for p. From this reaching definition, it extracts the initial value of
p, acc_initial = dest. Finally it gets the end value of p, acc_end =
dest+(cols+1)*(size/cols) by adding the initial value dest to
the accumulated update of p, (cols+1)*(size/cols) from acc .
Hence it returns [dest,dest+(cols+1)*(size/cols)] as the ex-
pressions denoting the access range [A1,An ].
Our access range analysis can be considered as a form of pattern-
based loop analysis [13] with several differences. On one hand,
access range analysis aims to derive the number of loop iterations
as an expression involving program variables and/or constants,
while pattern-based loop analysis aims to derive the number of loop
iterations as a constant. On the other hand, access range analysis
requires loops be normalized to fit the pattern required by pattern-
based loop analysis, and relies on loop canonicalization to normalize
loops.
To satisfy the soundness requirements, access range analysis
only works on loops that can be successfully normalized. If the
loops cannot be normalized, Senx will use loop cloning instead of
access range analysis .
3.4 Expression Translation
Because the patches Senx generates are source code patches, the
predicate of the patch must be evaluated in a single function scope.
However, sometimes the allocation range is computed in one func-
tion scope, while the memory access range is computed in a dif-
ferent function scope. So the expression denoting the allocation
range and the expression denoting the memory access range are not
both valid in a single function scope. To make the expressions both
valid in a single function scope, one possible solution is to send
the expression valid in a source function scope as a call argument
to a destination function scope where the expression is not valid.
This approach requires adding a new function parameter to the
destination function, and adding a corresponding call argument at
every call site of the destination function. We decided not to use this
approach because it requires code changes to any function on the
call chain from the source function to the destination function. In
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addition, unrelated functions that call any of the changed functions
will also have to be changed, resulting in a very intrusive patch.
Expression translation solves this problem by translating an ex-
pression exps from the scope of a source function fs to an equivalent
expression expd in the scope of a destination function fd . It does
not require adding new function parameters or call arguments like
the aforementioned solution. Senx uses expression translation to
translate both the buffer size expression and memory access range
expression into a single function scope where the predicate will be
evaluated. We call this process converging the predicate.
At a high level, expression translation can be considered as a
form of lightweight function summarization [17]. While function
summarization establishes the relations between the inputs to a
function and the outputs of a function, expression translation estab-
lishes the relations between the inputs to a function and a subset of
the local variables of the function. It works by exploiting the equiv-
alence between the arguments that are passed into the function by
the caller and the parameters that take on the argument values in
the scope of the callee. Using this equivalence, expression transla-
tion can iteratively translate expressions that are passed to function
invocations across edges in the call graph. Formally, expression
translation can converge the comparison between an expression
expa , the memory access range expression in fa , and exps , the
buffer size expression in fs iff along the set of edges E connecting
fa and fs in the program call graph, an expression equivalent to
either expa or exps form continuous sets of edges along the path
such that expa and exps can be translated along those sets into a
common scope.
Note that variables declared by a program as accessible across
different functions such as global variables in C/C++ do not require
the translation, although the use of such kind of variables is not
very common. We refer to both function parameters and such kind
of variables collectively as nonlocal variables. And we refer to
an expression consisting of only nonlocal variables as a nonlocal
expression.
The low-level implementation of expression translation in Senx
consists of two functions. Function translate_se_to_scopes, listed
in Algorithm 2, is the core of expression translation. It translates a
particular expression expr to the scope of all candidate functions
along the call stack stack .
We illustrate how it works with the code in Listing 1. For sim-
plicity, we use source code line numbers to represent the corre-
sponding instructions. To translate the buffer size involved in the
buffer overflow, Senx finds that the buffer is allocated from a call
to malloc at line 2 from the call stack that it associates with each
memory allocation, and invokes translate_se_to_scopes with
stack =[line 27 ], expr =“x*y+1”, inst =line 2 , f unc = foo_malloc.
The function first converts “x*y+1” into a definition in which vari-
ables are all parameters of foo_malloc, which we call a nonlocal
definition, if such conversion is possible. This conversion is done
by function make_nonlocal_expr listed in Algorithm 3, which
tries to find a nonlocal definition for each variable in expr and
then substitutes each variable with its matching nonlocal definition.
make_nonlocal_expr relies on find_nonlocal_def_for_var, which
Algorithm 2 Translating an expression to the scope of each func-
tion on the call stack.
Input: stack : a call stack consists of an ordered list of call instruc-
tion
expr : the expression to be translated
inst : the instruction to which expr is associated
Output: translated_exprs : the translated expr in the scope of each
caller function on the call stack
1: procedure translate_se_to_scopes
2: ▷ Translate expr to an expression in which all the vari-
ables are the parameters of f unc
3: f unc ←get_func(inst )
4: expr ←make_nonlocal_expr(f unc, inst , expr )
5: if expr , ∅ then
6: for call ∈ stack do
7: ▷ Substitute each parameter variable in expr with
its correspondent argument used in call
8: expr ←substitute_parms_with_args(call , expr )
9: f unc ←get_func(call )
10: translated_exprs[f unc] ← expr
11: expr ←make_nonlocal_expr(f unc, call , expr )
12: if expr = ∅ then
13: break
14: end if
15: end for
16: end if
17: return translated_exprs
18: end procedure
Algorithm 3Making a nonlocal expression.
Input: f : a function
inst : an instruction in f
expr : the RHS expression associated with inst
Output: nonlocal_expr : the nonlocalized expr
1: procedure make_nonlocal_expr
2: ▷mappinд stores the nonlocal definition for each variable
within expr
3: mappinд ← ∅
4: for var ∈ expr do
5: if ¬ is_var_nonlocal(f ,var ) then
6: de f ←find_nonlocal_def_for_var(f , inst ,var )
7: if de f = ∅ then
8: ▷We cannot find a nonlocal definition forvar
9: return ∅
10: else
11: mappinд[var ] ← de f
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: ▷ Substitute the occurrence of each variable with its non-
local definition
16: nonlocal_expr ←substitute_vars(expr ,mappinд)
17: return nonlocal_expr
18: end procedure
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recursively finds reaching definitions for local variables in a func-
tion, eventually building a definition for them in terms of the func-
tion parameters, global variables or the return values from function
calls. Note that a nonlocal definition can only be in the form of
an arithmetic expression without involving any functions. In this
case, the resulting expr is also “x*y+1” because both x and y are
parameters of foo_malloc.
It then iterates each call instruction in stack , starting from line 27.
For each call instruction, it substitutes the parameters in expr
with the arguments used in the call instruction. For line 27, it
substitutes x with rows and y with cols+1, respectively, by call-
ing helper function substitute_parms_with_args. As a conse-
quence, “x*y+1” becomes “rows*(cols+1)+1”. Hence it associates
“rows*(cols+1)+1” with function foo and stores the association
in expr_translated , because line 27 exists in function foo. After
that, it tries to convert “rows*(cols+1)+1” into a nonlocal def-
inition with respect to foo. At this point, it halts because both
rows and cols are assigned with return values of calls to function
extract_int. Otherwise, it will move on to the next function on
the call stack and continue the translation upwards the call stack.
However, in this case, expression translation is also able to translate
the memory access range expression from the scope of bar into
the scope of foo. Thus, Senx places the patch predicate in foo. If
expression translation fails to converge the expression, Senx will
abort patch generation.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented Senx as an extension of the KLEE LLVM
execution engine [6]. Like KLEE, Senx works on C/C++ programs
that are compiled into LLVM bitcode [45].
We re-use the LLVM bitcode execution portion of KLEE, and
as described in Section 3.2, to implement our expression builder,
but do not use any of the constraint collection or solving parts
of KLEE. For simplicity and ease of debugging, we represent our
expressions as text strings. To support arithmetic operations and
simple math functions on expressions, we leverage GiNaC, a C++
library designed to provide support for symbolic manipulations of
algebra expressions [16].
We implement a separate LLVM transformation pass to annotate
LLVM bitcode with information on loops such as the label for loop
pre-header and header, which is subsequently used by access range
analysis. This pass relies on LLVM’s canonicalization of natural
loops to normalize loops [7]. We extend LLVMSlicer [43] for loop
cloning. To locate error handling code, we use Talos [19].
Our memory allocation logger uses KLEE to interpose on mem-
ory allocations and stores the call stack for each memory allocation.
Senx extends KLEE to detect integer overflows and incorporates
the existing memory fault detection in KLEE to trigger our patch
generation. For alias analysis, Senx leverages DSA pointer analy-
sis [22].
Senx is implemented with 2,543 lines of C/C++ source code, not
including the Talos component used to identify error handling code.
Half of the source code is used to implement expression builder,
which forms the foundation of other components of Senx.
Table 3: Applications for testing real-world vulnerabilities.
App. Description SLOC
autotrace a tool to convert bitmap to vector
graphics
19,383
binutils a collection of programming tools for
managing and creating binary pro-
grams
2,394,750
libming a library for creating Adobe Flash files 88,279
libtiff a library for manipulating TIFF
graphic files
71,434
PHP the official interpretor for PHP pro-
gramming language
746,390
sqlite a relational database engine 189,747
ytnef TNEF stream reader 15,512
zziplib a library for reading ZIP archives 24,886
jasper a codec for JPEG standards 30,915
libarchive a multi-format archive and compres-
sion library
158,017
potrace a tool for tracing bitmap graphics 20,512
Total N/A 3,817,268
5 EVALUATION
First, we evaluate the effectiveness of Senx in fixing real-world
vulnerabilities. Second, we manually examine the produced patches
for correctness and compare them to the developer created patch.
For the sake of space, we only describe two of the patches in detail.
Last, we measure the applicability of loop cloning, access range
analysis, and expression translation using a larger dataset.
5.1 Experiment Setup
We build a corpus of vulnerabilities for Senx to attempt to patch
by searching online vulnerability databases [9, 14, 31], software
bug report databases, developers’ mailing groups [4, 34, 38], and
exploit databases [33]. We focus on vulnerabilities that fall into one
of the three types of vulnerabilities Senx can currently handle. We
then select vulnerabilities that meet the following three criteria: 1)
an input to trigger the vulnerability is either available or can be
created from the information available, 2) the vulnerable application
can be compiled into LLVM bitcode and executed correctly by
KLEE, and 3) the vulnerable application uses malloc to allocate
memory as Senx currently relies on this to infer the allocation size
of objects. Applications that use custommemory allocation routines
are currently not supported by Senx. We obtain the vulnerability-
triggering inputs or information about such inputs from the blogs of
security researchers, bug reports, exploit databases, mailing groups
for software users, or test cases attached to patch commits [1, 2, 5,
33, 41, 53].
From this, we construct a corpus of 42 real-world buffer overflow,
integer overflow and bad cast vulnerabilities along with proof of
concept exploits to evaluate the effectiveness of Senx in patching
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are drawn from 11 applications
show in Table 3, which include 8 media and archive tools and
libraries, PHP, sqlite, and a collection of programming tools for
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managing and creating binary programs. The associated vulnera-
bilities consist of 19 buffer overflows, 13 integer overflows, and 10
bad cast vulnerabilities.
All our experiments were conducted on a desktop with quad-
core 3.40GHz Intel i7-3770 CPU, 16GB RAM, 3TB SATA hard drive
and 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.
5.2 How Effective is Senx in Patching
Vulnerabilities?
For each vulnerability of an application, we run the correspond-
ing program under Senx with a vulnerability-triggering input. If
Senx generates a patch, we examine the patch for correctness. To
determine if a patch is correct, we apply the three following tests a)
we check for semantic equivalence with the official patch released
by the vendor if available and semantic correctness by analyzing
the code, b) we apply the patch and verify that the vulnerability
is no longer triggered by the input and c) we check as best we
can that the patch does not interfere with regular operation of the
application by using the application to process benign inputs. If
Senx aborts patch generation, we examine what caused Senx to
abort.
Our results are summarized in Table 4. Column “Type” indicates
whether the vulnerability is a 1○ buffer overflow, 2○ bad cast, or 3○
integer overflow. Column “Expressions” shows whether Senx can
successfully construct all expressions that are required to synthesize
a patch, as some code constructs may contain expressions outside
of the theories Senx supports in its symbolic ISA. “Loop Analysis”
describes whether loop cloning or access range analysis (ARA)
is used if the vulnerability contained a loop. “Patch Placement”
lists the type of patch placement: “Trivial” means that the patch is
placed in the same function as the vulnerability and “Translated”
means that the patch must be translated to a different function.
“Data Access” describes whether or not the patch predicate involves
complex data access such as fields in a struct or array indices. Finally,
“Patched?” summarizes whether the patch generated by Senx fixes a
vulnerability. The 10 vulnerabilities where Senx aborts generating
a patch are highlighted in red.
Over the 42 vulnerabilities, Senx generates 32 (76.2%) patches,
all of which are correct according to our three criteria. Of the 14
patched buffer overflows, loop analysis is roughly split between
loop cloning and access range analysis (6 and 8 respectively). Senx
elects not to use loop cloning mainly due to two causes. First, due to
an imprecise alias analysis that does not distinguish different fields
of structs correctly, the program slicing tool utilized by Senx may
include instructions that are irrelevant to computing loop iterations
into slices. Unfortunately these instructions call functions that can
have side-effects so the slices cannot be used by Senx. Second, for
a few cases the entire body of the loops is control dependent on
the result of a call to a function that has side-effects. For example,
the loops involved in CVE-2017-5225 are only executed when a call
to malloc succeeds. Because malloc can make system calls, Senx
also cannot clone the loops.
Senx must place 23.8% of the patches in a function different from
where the vulnerability exists. This is particularly acute for buffer
overflows (46.2% of cases), which have to compare a buffer alloca-
tion with a memory access range. This illustrates that expression
translation contributes significantly to the patch generation abil-
ity of Senx, particularly for buffer overflows, which make up the
majority of memory corruption vulnerabilities. Senx’s handling
of complex data accesses is also used in 48.5% of the patches, in-
dicating this capability is required to handle a good number of
vulnerabilities
Senx aborts patch generation for 10 vulnerabilities. The dominant
cause for these aborts is that Senx is not able to converge to a
function scope where all symbolic variables in the patch predicate
are available. There is also one case (jasper-CVE-2017-5501) where
Senx cannot find appropriate error-handling code to synthesize the
patch. In these cases, the patch requires more significant changes
to the application code that are beyond the capabilities of Senx. In
other cases, Senx detects that there are multiple reaching definitions
for patch predicates that it does not have an execution input for.
Currently, Senx only accepts one execution path executed by the
single vulnerability-triggering input. In the future we plan to handle
these cases by allowing Senx to accept multiple inputs to cover the
paths along which the other reaching definitions exist. Finally, Senx
aborts for a couple of vulnerabilities because both loop cloning and
access range analysis fail.
5.3 Patch Case Study
Out of the 32 generated patches, we select 2 patches to describe in
detail.
libtiff-CVE-2017-5225. This is a heap buffer overflow in libtiff,
which can be exploited via a specially crafted TIFF image file.
The overflow occurs in a function cpContig2SeparateByRow that
parses a TIFF image into rows and dynamically allocates a buffer to
hold the parsed image based on the number of pixels per row and
bits per pixel. By using an inconsistent bits per pixel parameter, the
attacker can cause libtiff to allocate a buffer smaller than the size
of the pixel data and cause a buffer overflow.
When Senx captures the buffer overflow via running libtiff with
a crafted TIFF image file, it first identifies that the buffer is allo-
cated using the value of variable scanlinesizein and the starting
address of the buffer is stored in variable inbuf. Hence it uses
[inbuf, inbuf + scanlinesizein] to denote the buffer range.
Senx then finds that the buffer overflow occurs in a 3-level nested
loop and that the pointer used to access the buffer is dependent on
the loop induction variable. Senx classifies the vulnerability as a
buffer overflow.
Loop cloning fails because the loop slice is dependent on a call to
_TIFFmalloc, which subsequently calls malloc. Thus, Senx applies
access range analysis. Access range analysis detects that only the
outer and inner-most loops affect the memory access pointer and
from the extracted induction variables, computes the expression
[inbuf, inbuf+spp*imagewidth] to represent the access range.
Because both the buffer range and the access range start at
inbuf, Senx synthesizes the patch predicate as spp*imagewidth >
scanlinesizein. Senx then finds that cpContig2SeparateByRow
contains error handling code, which has a label bad, and generates
the patch as below. As the buffer allocation and overflow occur
in the same function, Senx puts the patch immediately before the
buffer allocation.
i f ( spp ∗ imagewidth > s c a n l i n e s i z e i n )
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Table 4: Patch generation by Senx
App. CVE# Type Expressions Loop Analysis Patch Placement Data Access Patched?
sqlite CVE-2013-7443 3○ Determinate — Failed — ✗
CVE-2017-13685 3○ Determinate — Trivial Simple ✓
zziplib CVE-2017-5976 1○ Determinate Cloned Translated Complex ✓
CVE-2017-5974 3○ Determinate — Translated Complex ✓
CVE-2017-5975 3○ Determinate — Translated Complex ✓
Potrace CVE-2013-7437 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
libming CVE-2016-9264 3○ Determinate — Trivial Simple ✓
libtiff CVE-2016-9273 1○ Indeterminate — — — ✗
CVE-2016-9532 1○ Determinate Cloned Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-5225 1○ Determinate ARA Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2016-10272 1○ Determinate ARA Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2016-10092 3○ Determinate — Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2016-5102 3○ Determinate — Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2006-2025 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
libarchive CVE-2016-5844 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
jasper CVE-2016-9387 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2016-9557 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-5501 2○ Determinate — Failed/Error handling — ✗
ytnef CVE-2017-9471 1○ Determinate Cloned Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9472 1○ Determinate Cloned Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9474 1○ Determinate Failed — — ✗
PHP CVE-2011-1938 1○ Determinate ARA Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2014-3670 1○ Determinate ARA Translated Complex ✓
CVE-2014-8626 1○ Determinate Cloned Trivial Simple ✓
binutils CVE-2017-15020 1○ Determinate ARA Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9747 1○ Determinate Cloned Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2017-12799 3○ Determinate — Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-6965 3○ Determinate — Failed — ✗
CVE-2017-9752 3○ Determinate — Translated Simple ✓
CVE-2017-14745 2○ Determinate — Failed — ✗
autotrace CVE-2017-9151 1○ Indeterminate — — — ✗
CVE-2017-9153 1○ Indeterminate — — — ✗
CVE-2017-9156 1○ Determinate ARA Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9157 1○ Determinate ARA Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9168 1○ Determinate Failed — — ✗
CVE-2017-9191 1○ Determinate ARA Failed — ✗
CVE-2017-9161 2○ Determinate — Trivial Simple ✓
CVE-2017-9183 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-9197 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-9198 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-9199 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
CVE-2017-9200 2○ Determinate — Trivial Complex ✓
goto bad ;
The official patch invokes the same error handling and is placed
at the same location as Senx’s patch. However, the official patch
checks that “(bps != 8)”. From further analysis, we find that both
patches are equivalent, though the human-generated patch relies
on the semantics of the libtiff format, while Senx’s patch directly
checks that the loop cannot exceed the size of the allocated buffer.
libarchive-CVE-2016-5844.This integer overflow in the ISO parser
in libarchive can result in a denial of service via a specially crafted
ISO file. The overflow happens in function choose_volume when it
multiplies a block index, which is a 32-bit integer, with a constant
number. This can exceed the maximum value that can be repre-
sented by a 32-bit integer and overflow into a negative number,
which is then used as a file offset.
Senx detects the integer overflow when it runs libarchive’s ISO
parser with a crafted ISO file. It generates an expression of the
overflown value as the product of 2048 and vd→location. Further
Senx detects that the overflown value is assigned to a 64-bit variable
skipsize, thus classifying this as a repairable integer overflow.
Senx patches the vulnerability by casting the 32-bit value to a 64-bit
value before multiplying:
− s k i p s i z e = LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE ∗ vd−> l o c a t i o n ;
+ s k i p s i z e = 2048 ∗ ( i n t 6 4 _ t ) vd−> l o c a t i o n ;
The official patch is essentially identical to the patch generated by
Senx. The only difference is that the official patch uses the constant
LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE rather than its equivalent value 2048 in the
multiplication.
5.4 Applicability
We evaluate how applicable loop cloning, access range analysis and
expression translation are across a larger dataset. To generate such
a dataset, we extract all loops that access memory buffers and the
allocations of these buffers from the 11 programs in GNU Coreutils,
regardless of whether they contain vulnerabilities or not. We then
apply Senx’s loop analysis to all loops and find that loop cloning
can be applied to 88% of the loops and access range analysis can
be applied to 46% of the loops. This is in line with our results from
the vulnerabilities. For the sake of space, we describe the details of
these experiments in the Appendix.
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6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Automatic Patch Generation
Leveraging FixPatterns.By observing common human-developer
generated patches, PAR generates patches using fix patterns such
as altering method parameters, adding a null checker, calling an-
other method with the same arguments, and adding an array bound
checker [20]. Senx differs from PAR in two aspects. First, PAR is
unable to generate a patch when the correct variables or meth-
ods needed to synthesize a patch are not accessible at the faulty
function or method. Second, PAR uses a trial-and-error approach
that tries out not only each fixing pattern upon a given bug, but
also variables or methods that are accessible at the faulty function
or method to synthesize a patch. On the contrary, Senx employs
a guided approach that identifies the type of the given bug and
chooses a corresponding patch model to generate the patch for the
bug and systematically finds the correct variables to synthesize the
patch based on semantic information provided by a patch model.
LeakFix fixes memory leak bugs by adding a memory deallo-
cation statement for a leaked memory allocation at the correct
program location [15]. By abstracting a program into a CFG con-
taining only program statements related to memory allocation,
deallocation, and usage, LeakFix transforms the problem of finding
a fix for a memory leak into searching for a CFG edge where a
memory deallocation statement can be added to fix the memory
leak without introducing new bugs.
Using Program Mutations. GenProg is a pioneering work that
induces program mutations, i.e. genetic programming, to generate
patches [52]. Leveraging test suites, it focuses on program code that
is executed for negative test cases but not for positive test cases and
utilizes program mutations to produce modifications to a program.
As a feedback to its program mutation algorithm, it considers the
weighted sum of the positive test cases and negative test cases that
the modified program passes. Treating all the results of program
mutations as a search space, its successor improves the scalability by
changing to use patches instead of abstract syntax trees to represent
modifications and exploiting search space parallelism [23].
Using SMT Solvers. SemFix [32] and Angelix [28] use constraint
solving to find the needed expression to replace incorrect expres-
sions used in a program. By executing a target program symbolically
with both inputs triggering a defect and inputs not triggering the
defect, they identify the constraints that the target program must
satisfy to process both kinds of inputs correctly. They then syn-
thesize a patch using component-based program synthesis, which
combines components such as variables, constants, and arithmetic
operations to synthesize a symbolic expression that can make the
target program satisfy the identified constraints.
Learning from Correct Code. Prophet learns from existing cor-
rect patches [26]. It uses a parameterized log-linear probabilistic
model on two features extracted from the abstract trees of each
patch: 1) the way the patch modifies the original program and 2)
the relationships between how the values accessed by the patch are
used by the original program and by the patched program. With
the probabilistic model, it ranks candidate patches that it generated
for a defect by the probabilities of their correctness. Finally it uses
test suites to test correctness of the candidate patches. Like other
generate-and-validate automatic patch generation techniques, its
effectiveness depends on the quality of the test suites.
6.2 Prevention of Exploiting Security
Vulnerabilities
Fortifying Programs. One way to prevent vulnerabilities from
being exploited is by fortifying programs to make them more ro-
bust to malicious inputs. Software Fault Isolation (SFI) instruments
checks before memory operations to ensure that they cannot cor-
rupt memory [18, 30, 49, 54]. Control Flow Integrity (CFI) learns
valid control flow transfers of a program and validates control flow
transfers to prevent execution of exploit code [12, 48, 55]. Alterna-
tively, some techniques modify the layout or permissions of critical
memory regions to detect or prevent exploits [8, 11, 40, 42, 46, 47].
By contrast, Talos introduces the notion of SecurityWorkarounds
for Rapid Response (SWRR), which steers program execution away
from a vulnerability to error handling code, and instruments SWRRs
to programs to prevent malicious inputs from triggering vulnera-
bilities [19].
While these techniques prevent exploit of vulnerabilities at the
cost of extra runtime overhead or loss of program functionality,
Senx generates patches to fix vulnerabilities without imposing such
a cost.
Filtering Inputs. Some techniques detect and simply filter out
malicious inputs [3, 10, 27, 44, 50]. Among them, Bouncer combines
static analysis and symbolic analysis to infer the constraints to
exploit a vulnerability and generates an input filter to drop such
malicious inputs [10]. Shields models a vulnerability as a protocol
state machine and constructs network filters based on it [50].
While most of these techniques identify malicious inputs by the
semantics or syntax of the malicious inputs, some of them focus on
the semantics of vulnerabilities [3, 27]. Similar to these techniques,
Senx also uses the semantics of vulnerabilities to synthesize patches.
However, Senx has a different goal of generating patches to fix
vulnerabilities.
Rectifying Inputs.Alternative to filtering inputs, some techniques
rectify malicious inputs to prevent them from triggering vulner-
abilities. With taint analysis, SOAP learns constraints on input
by observing program executions with benign inputs. From the
constraints that it has learned, it identifies input that violates the
constraints and tries to change the input to make it satisfy the
constraints. By doing so, it not only renders the input harmless but
also allows the desired data in the rectified input to be correctly
processed [24].
Based on the observation that exploit code embedded in inputs
is often fragile to any slight changes, A2C encodes inputs with
a one-time dictionary and decodes them only when the program
execution goes beyond the paths likely to have vulnerabilities in
order to disable the embedded exploit code [21].
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the design and implementation of Senx, a sys-
tem that automatically generates patches for buffer overflow, bad
cast, and integer overflow vulnerabilities. Senx uses three novel
program analysis techniques introduced in this paper: loop cloning,
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access range analysis and expression translation. In addition, Senx
utilizes an expression representation that facilitates the translation
of expressions extracted from symbolic execution back into C/C++
source code. Enabled by these techniques, Senx generates patches
correctly for 76% of the 42 real-world vulnerabilities. Senx’s main
limitations are limited precision in alias analysis for loop cloning,
and the inability to converge expressions to find a location in the
program where all necessary variables are in scope.
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APPENDIX
We measure how often expression translation is able to converge
the memory access range and buffer allocation size into a single
function scope, and find that it is able to do so in 85% of the cases.
We use 11 programs from the GNU Coreutils as listed in Table 5
to evaluate the applicability of our analysis techniques. The most
common reasons for Senx’s access range analysis to be aborted
is that loops cannot be normalized by LLVM. For example, the
number of times a loop that parses string input iterates depends
on the content of the string. Such a string cannot be symbolically
analyzed by access range analysis.
To understand the reasons that can cause expression translation
to abort, we try to converge the buffer size and memory access
range for the loops that we could successfully analyze and tabulate
the results in Table 6. The “Access Range” column tabulates the
average percentage of functions in the loop’s call stack that expres-
sion translation could translate the memory access range into and
“Buffer Range” tabulates the average percentage of functions in the
buffer allocation’s call stack that expression translation could trans-
late the buffer allocation size into. Finally “Converged” indicates
out of all loops, what percentage could expression translation find a
common function scope in which to place the patch. As we can see,
it seems that the buffer allocation size frequently takes parameters
that are calculated fairly close in the call stack to the allocation
point, and those values are not available higher up in the call chain,
thus limiting the functions scopes many of these cases could be
converged to.
Table 5: Programs for evaluating applicability.
Program Type SLOC LLVM bitcode
sha512sum data checksum 581 135KB
pr text formatting 1,723 194KB
head text manipulation 761 109KB
dir directory listing 3,388 418KB
od file dumping 1,368 237KB
ls directory listing 3,388 418KB
base64 data encoding 238 91KB
wc text processing 784 120KB
cat file concatenating 495 182KB
sort data sorting 3,251 433KB
printf format and print data 694 198KB
AVG N/A 1,516 230KB
Table 6: Convergence of expression translation.
Program Access Range Buffer Range Converged
pr 100% 10% 100%
head 100% 25% 100%
tr 86% 36% 100%
od 54% 16% 58%
cat 100% 33% 100%
dir 71% 14% 57%
ls 42% 33% 34%
base64 100% 33% 100%
md5sum 100% 33% 100%
sha512sum 97% 80% 97%
sort 91% 10% 90%
AVG. 85% 29% 85%
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